University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

3-21-1974

U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Pacific and Asia
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing Pacific and Asia" (1974). Mike Mansfield
Speeches, Statements and Interviews. 1172.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/1172

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

·U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

n~

A CIIA."'l'GING PACIFIC A.\'D ASIA

An Article
by

Mike

~~t.msfield

Mn.jority Leader
United States Sero.te

U. S.

1.

~IGN

POLleY IN A

CHP.NGD~O PAC!1~IC

AND ASIA

The !71xon Vi!lit to Chtl'..n--1\ Turninc; Point

The first hnl.:f' of this decade hn.s w1tncesed a. i\ml7..runen~;o.1 t~.nsfo:r.:-::.:J....
t1on in the foreign policy o:f' the United states .
yea-re., them hne been e.n

appreci~ble

nm•e tnre.y .fro:n t.'le role of

M'.:.i-CO"t"J~\tnl~·· ~:.

centurion in ASia, to._.'flrd. a :more s ubtle a:cd mea uins;f'ul rclr.:-.Mons M.p

viai t

f.'~:;':!

VTi thin the ohort :Jpa""l of

to the People' e Rcpv.bl5.c of China sy-n.'1olizcd t.l;.i s c hm1(:e.

w~.th

th·-"

'T".:!c> '="-'·! )horic.

of d:tncu.ssione ., ba.nqueto and. toastn in l?e ldnz enveloped t he pollcy of bO';coJ,/.:.:
1solntion e.nd.

o~trne:l.mn

relatione for

~ l<m~

of CO!lt:'!Unict no.tion!l vhieh h.."\d dor.1imted tT . S . - As:!.o.n

dcc:"td€'s .

Of courso, the e.ecumulation of sunp1e:lo':'.

diatruat did not Msapper>..r 1n a r.toment .
!!'..'lrked the end of the Cold \ l:.u-.

in

u. s.

r;cvcrthelca s, the

Preoide::l~ ' n

To be sure, there wi ll be tw:!.sm o.m:.

policy in the future which no one can no•,r prcd:lct.

howover, is and will rcr.ltl1n one of

e:~cn<lir'..g

The

c.·<~.

v:lc::·::;
tt'.:').~

b~'j:tc c.i.rcc·;;.::.o~;

conto.cts Yi th Chir.a c.nu on

bet:~

the governmental and persOM.l lmrcl::l.
The

~ficat1ona

where in Mia .

of the tum in Sino-u .

s.

relatior.:; ore

There is e dJ.rect rclo.t1oroh1p , for eXi!'.:rnplc,

bctv.ecl'~

China policy and the reduction of the le-1e l of Nnerlce.n mil:t t.o.r-.r

Southeast Asia.

Troop w:l.thdrownl fran V:1ct !nr.l 'l:hs a

Chinese leadership that U.

s.

c0-c~

pow~rful

the nm:

1.'1volvc.':1~:1"!:.

::r-.

ni(;l".al to t::c·

pol:1c1ee, henccaorth, would conet1tutc no

and present danger to Chinn 'o securtty .

cl.o;c-

It 1n notable , too, t."'lat

c:0 "'.:T,"

d-.~rln.::;

t!:c

South Vietne.meoe incurston into EiOUthcrn J'. AOS in Fcbl"I.W.ry-}·b rch 1971, U. ;.] .
off1c1alo were at pains to tls su.re Pekir.g t 'h!!t the move ...'O'..tld

po~e

no t."l:rc.:.'.- ·::.o

- ~

Ch1n.'1.
the

Even before that

pre~ence

of the

t~1():~~ Gtates

Seventh_~ ._t'M::t.;

.re..ivan

._,tr~~1ts

before the Prca i<!ent 'e trip to Chi"k"\ 1 the 'ni 'tecl

to

~tatcs rec~ll~

t;.-o

~o·

... ., .......,
."'""".,...,·-----

from Tah'llll vhich were especially cqui"ppcd to carry nuclca.r wca:vono.
by

~reel!'~

to the "five pdnc:l.:_1lc::; or IJ"!aCc:t'nl CO-cx:tstence)"

the People •a Repub!Uc 1 Pres :tt:0nt

:~1xon

ecotu~e

mu<lc a

u. s.

conc!.u~~ ion o~

at the

conc•)~·l' :-;~

~ct

Japan M.s been nffectctl.
Republic .

oc;.-'r

t~or.o broue;~t

on Jap3.n

deC?~'

by the

n~n,.

U. s . policy

to~r;.:>:<l

The cha.nc;c cruno ouC.C'.cnly end on the heels of the

shock af rcv1£1ona in

u. s.

trade nncl nonct:l.ry policies.

These 'tY:o

t:-tc

<'".rl~_o::con~::~;::-r"l-

a realization thnt the old r ebtio:nsnip with t!l.:! Jni tc ·. !Jt::-. :,c'~

\,"'ul<1 no lon,ser suffice.
vere not

!... · '

presence in Aoia.
2.

People'~

prc::;-.:>.:•'1 ',:-,:

OS

visit to China vhich was ClcsicncC. to lay at reGt ony linc;erine
t~c

·,"--:

A ne'W' role in Aaia

~ras

eo be lost in the rapidly ch:lnGing scene .

States 1 the tt'1ln.S1tion in U • S • policies ha:J hu.d
of a more indcpenclent Japanese forcicn policy .
which holcls the two nations

tozeth~r

::nJ~-:;r~::rtc

in order if ,Japan 'o
Aa seen from the

3. countr~~rt

in

t~!1:ltcC.

th~ C!"lCl'CC':!C~

! t is a policy, ao we

with the ndhe3ive of the

a~~

it,

Defen~c A.~ic!1~c

but elsa opens the 'ro:y to more vic;orouc Japanese ini t:ta.tivcs in the cco!1<Y't::c

visit to Chine. by mcrvinc directly into t.J.i.'.;! eote.bli!lhment or f'ull c.ir<Lo:-r.c.t: c
relations with

~1a.t

nation while t .is

"IIT.!.th rece,rd to Taivan .

n~tio::::1

r em::.:i.ncd 1.!1 c.n

Al:::o to be notr.d in th:to

Cl'i:>icuo'l~ vo:::~t:o:."\

conncct~on

:1s t:1-e

- 3 -

1nd~nt Japanese opp~~ftt•;M~to, and the inareesinz
indications that J'9.pan 1e dctermin€cc, \·rh- or wl~10ut u. s. particip.").t:!.on~' to
~d

reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the joint development of energy
other resources 1n soviet Asia.

3. Er:t'eet on traiwn and south Korea

u. s.

Insofar ae Ta1vnn and South Korea are concerned,
the

ehe.~e

had been eo.st in the eeverest tcn.nfl of the Cold

by the moat militant e.nt1•CO!!l!llUl'l1st govcrll!OOnts 1n Asia.

W~r

!n

L>Ol:tcie~ bcf'o~"r:'

eo.nd

w~re

=::::=: r-:o:-:-e::2 ,

united states went eo rer as to fight a blcocy w.r with Chinene troopo

three yeare in a manifestation of o. determination to etop CO!llm'.mio:n.

the 1950's, conf'ronte.t1ons in

u. s.

t.~e

s:..-p;:>o!""c0:J.
+.4~

~c:- nc::::::~~

'::':d. c-~ :~n

Taiw-a.Tl e.rco. t-.llr.ost produced o.d..d!t:'.ono.l Sir..o-

hostilities.

The shift 1n U. S . -ch1n:l policy hcs left Tai-.,.-an and· So-...tth
kind of international limbo.

Korea 'o po31 tion tod.cy c.r...d t:."lc spcck.l rcht::.o:"D:·r".;

which is l'M1nta1ned by the Un1 ted. stn:':.cn vi th

tl"~t

cou...Tltl-.f can

as in the past, 1n tel'!n!l of the thrco.t of SO'lict or Chincae
Rather, there ie in Seoul merely one Korean government

~:rG.1y

•

e G"'.::cc-:::·_-, ...,~.,

C~"lio~ (;:z::"P:'>;~...::··"·

controllir~

a

the peninsula and cC'!l!peting with a.notner to the north f'or influence

Korean people.

in a

:~ore~

oe0ccn~ o~
vl·l;:~

the

The talk of "l1bero.t1on," either •.,my, is rcp:t.eced by c::.lli for

reconciliation.
At one time, the Tniwnn gove:rnmcnt

triumphant :return

or

a.nti-comw.t!11st forceo to

support of the United state3.

loo!tcd tO','al'd the
th~

dfj;y

Chineoe mainJ.!'.nd

of t:'lc
,_~ t.'ll

the

TodD.y, Taiwn :ls a regi!:.c which adminiotcro c

proaperous :region with fifteen million inhnb!t::L."lts while etill clc.!nrl.ng to r.1lc

Boo million Chinese w1 th ,,n,om 1 t lns had. 11ttle contact eince 1949.

()\rc!" t:1~

- 4 ,d far npnrt and tnc

yeo.re , the People's

strea~

is that the former,

of Ch1ncoc h1ctory.

In the eirctun.atances, U. S . relations with Koreo. and Tn:l'l.'nn,
with regard to defense ca:mnit!:lents, have lost much of their oricl!W.l
The United states can no lor>..ger bnse its st..-pport of Tah':m on t ..c
the Nationalist Govei'Il!llent .

Indeed, it h:ls

e.lre~ey

extended

t.~e

ccpcc~. -:-~.:.Y

'!'~tior.:::..'!...c.;J

:!.~z~t:lm~cy

o::

~ !'c.c·~o t!iplcn:~t:".c

recognition to the People's Republic of Chino. through e.cc':!ptrulce
in

rcel~ty

o:::

t.hc httcr

United Nations e..l'ld by agreeing to the estabLsbment of liai:;on oi'ficcc

in washington e.nd PekinG•

As for the CO!lltlitc":'lent in Korea, it

c~n

justified on the grounds of a thrent of aczreosion by "monolithic

communism" in the Far Eo.at as 1t wa twenty yeo.rs
d~scribed

ceo.

Even

acc.rcezy be
1nterl"~tior.~..l

lc~3 co.~

! t be

as a support for the position of the Uniteu Netion5 whic. nppcaro to

have lost interest in the
The

s1~~t1on

years ago .

u . s . mllitar:t position in Koree

altered 1n a substantial fa.ohion .

and Taiwan hes

e.lreacy been

Twenty tho'J!land American troopo lc!'t

in 19711 and sentiment existe in Congress for

~~rther

eutbacke .

oreo.

!n the -972

Shanghai communique, President Nixon committed the United States to the

~~c~t~l

vithdra.wal of all U. S . mil! tnry persormel from Tabron while a.c:.tnm;lcO.c;inc

!.I

The U.

s . -Republic of Ch:l.r..~ !•:\ttual Defense Trenty states t}'l..at ''D:l.ch ?o.rt.y
recognizes that e.n armed e.ttc.ck in the 'ilcst Pc.cific N:cn d::.rcctcc2
e.gninst the t~rri tori co of either of the Pnrtics wot•~d be <.1...:::.!1c;c'!'0'1~
to its ovn peace e.n1 scfcty and declD.res tha.t :i..t ~rmlcl cct to meet
the cO!l'.:nton d::m~cr in accor(hncc 1;rith its consti tutiono.l procc'":::."
The U. S . -Republic of Kore:J. !·~\ltuol Defense Trcn.ty contc.iP..z o:i.;:1i!c.r
le.ngue.ge : "Each Party reC00lliZco the.t o.n anr.ed 1:1.tt:J.cl: in the !?~d~ic
area on either of t?:le Pn!"tics in terri toric::> now under t~1e:l..r rccpcctive adJninistrative control, or hcrenftcr reCOG!lized by one of U1c
Parties as l!lwl'u.lly broucht under t."le n&niniGtra.tive control or t.'lc
other, vould be chngerous to ita 01m pea.ce and safety e.nd clcc.....::lr~~
the t 1 t •.rould act to I!!ect t."le comon d.'lnger in nccorclo.nce w.t t:1 it::;
constitutional proces:;es."
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in Southeast Asia,. alter dr....... ·

the

Pacific.

~<lestern

4.

Chang1ng Approaches in Aid, Trnde end Diplomacy

The chtmg1ng U.

s.

role is c.lflo reflected in a1d-pro3:-aroo .

For

:!1...'1.-"!:f

years, Waohington viewed assistance primarily tn.rot.'lgh the eyes of t he Cold ;.;c.::" .

It wae regarded as a veepon :tn the struggle to pre$crve the
Asian countries from Chinese-inspired
and stability.

Moistance

\."aS

in !!'2-ey eases it w.s tied to

c.e~rcssion

and, thuo 1 c

provided pree.ominantly on e.

countcrinsur~cncy

o.nu other

of

indepcn~ence

sourc~

b1J.r.~/~crc1

of

oecur~~Y

ba.n!.c anu.

d~!'eM~-rel:ltc(t

activities.
Thie eype or aid ie still a s1cn1ficant part of the

notably in Southeast Asia.
emer.ged. vith e. broo.der

u. s.

c.1d

pros~~~ ,

In t'!'le lo.ot fe'.r yenrs, hOt·rever, nmt coneept::;

vj.e~on

of the situe.tio:l in Mia ar..cl the Weotcrn

l:I.V c

P::1c::r:.c .

GO\I'errnncntal Group on Ind.one51e. 1 in both of ·.rhich the U!'..ited staten

p::-.rtic tr,n··~c::'l ,

given to problems or a..,.noriettlture 1 econ'Jl:lliC developme!lt, :popullltion,

(XLth, :;::.:.,:._

As multilateral ees1et.1lnce pro~s

crcr,,

bikrt crnl

u. s.

fl.ctivitie~ ere i'!- -

cl1n1ng.
New patterns of trnde are o.lzo emerc;ing in the

Asia.

~{catern

Po.c1.f:tc and

For years, bilnterel ccmnercc between Ja.p:1n e.nd the United. St...'l.'tec

the scene.

do!"'~.!"'..::J.'::()c.1

Tod!ly, Jnpnn has expending Com'll.crcia_ ties w"lth the A:<Jic.n rca:l.nl:::.:'lc..

- 6 and the 1olond ne.tions t<> ~~~"""2) ~~
leolline; eou.ree of imports ~~
eon~umer of

1 to e:xportcd

pro<.11.~cts .

n \.1:.1 s

of tho

ChL~ese

very extensive.
e.a an oil

to

devol~

e~orting

L~ur

1nd.1ca.tcu vrevioc.::::'..:•,

M

po:l:~ib1lit1cs

for J'c.,c.ncoc trcclc

.!/

It

1:~

~c;ro•m 11

al::o

frcn

int~rc~t:lng

prectic~l:cy ~ro

int-:!n'.:.::o~

to note the

thc!r petroleum re3ources vhieh arc reported to

c

nntion of the firot ren!'O. in A:lia •
c~c

1!! to be found 1n

t~e

movement tot-JO.rd nc•..r

Dccl.e.rotion of 1971., there ic c. c:11l for a neutrolimtion cf

southeast Asia vhic h vould be cuare.ntccd by the mtljor powers.

Rccionn2.1C!ll h::o

o.lso developed an increased ii:rpcttm, a:> non-co:rr!:'.miot Asia lns bcc-.m to
the need for a prompt normalization of rclotiono with tho

C~ist

elined 1n importance.
negotiation!l on unity.

!C!l c!~-

North Koreo.-Gouth Koren are c:Jgoc;cd in in'vcrmittcnt
south Koren. io m::iliing cff'orto to coto.bl:sb

vi th the Soviet Union and Chintl.

Japan and C'.aioo have e:xpo.ndccl.

Thailancl end

co~tct:J

Diplomatic a.nd coonnercieJ. relatione bctt.;ccn
Philippine trccle hlls be(;Un with tl1c

neptiblie of China end v1th the cou.."ltriea or eootern Europe end
bet,~een

rc:::?..:~c

otntco.

Tl'ru.o , the mill trult e.nti-Cax:::u.."liot southocot Aoio. Treaty Orgtmization

grolling

i"!

It may well be that l-rithtn the nc:ct; dcccd.c ChiM vLl e:ncrc')

.Another area of

Kuala

:)31on c.nd 1o cleo the _co.cl:lr..~

On the other Gide of the coin, U. S. tro.cL

with the People'e Republic or Chli'..e l'..a.s

1971 to $753 milllDn in 1973

the tlhlted sto.teo "" tho

The <.mcrc;y cristo,

has eanpelled an intense cJC'l!:lii'.:ltion of t!1c

o.nd investment vitll soviet Asia..

-

r,~io

on the one

hc..~d

:rcopl~ 'o

contn~t~

and the Pcoplc'o

ere
!\~'..l:,~c

of ChiM on the other.

y

U. S. Departroont or C~crce. U. s . Porclf~ T~ue: Tiichlichto of z~~ort~
and Importl:l 1 Dcccr:.ber 1973 . ~.Jo.sh:!ns-'.-on, u. s. acvt. !'r:lnt. orr.

1974: 45,D3.
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The nev era of

reneu~d

O!!li ty which beeen o:f'f1cio.J.:cy vi tb Prczir.'..c!l.t

Nixon' a visit follow e. procesGion of shifts in U. S. ,olicy on Ch_no..

we, first, the "special re..tationship"
of world t-Tar II and innnediatcly

o~

clooc coo:;>eration uur1ng t;,.c ycnro

there~tcr.

Then co..:·nc the time o'1: 0"5.m

after the creation at the People' a Reyublic .

~'lllt

hoct.i:'..~.':y

w:-.s followed, e...""t.er the

Moacov-Peldng echiam o:f' the 60'o, by a period of ecquieccence in the
C~ernment's

'l"'.aerc

Pc~trnc;

existence.

These same yenra have seen e. tro."lofomation 1n U. S. atti t,:.C.c~ tm:.::rC.
Japan.

A:J v1eved from the United St:'lteo, the

Jo.r>n.nc~c

f:ron c-.

have evolve

militant foe of "t:orld Har II, to an occupied a."l<l dcvo.sted nation, to a qu:1.s::ind.;:?enC:-::rr~

dependent partner in resistance to CC!:'i'J:l:t!.."list o.ggresaion, to a. grrot
pcr.rcr .

Jnpe.n is regarded today on both a prlr.c:i:pel trc.ding pm-tncr o.nt1 o.

economic rival.!/ As

mic.~t

be expected, the

p~ular

r eo.ctiona ere a

~.Jor

~~~'cur o~

enthusiasm and anxiety.
NJ for southeaot Asia, tbe refjion

ant1-ccmnuniet crusade tl.fter the Korc=n \·lar .
crusede in J\.a1a but before it
to

t..~e

Vietnamese

~r

'~>J:l3

bec~e

the focal po:tnt :ror the t!' . S.

It t.-a:. to prove to be t..hc met

O'fer, o h:llf-a.-nillion n:cn hcd been ccn::nlt'.-ccl

ab. a cost or tens of thotm=mcb of casunlttes v.nu b.unC:rcC'::::

of billions of dollars.

This l:luttor ex.:?ericnce c!ll!le to e.n end two

vi th the final vi thdrmml of U. S . forccG frcm lnC.ochina in

ernpheais 1n U. S. poliC"J in Southeant Asia h2d bccr>.:.n to c

y

u. s.

e..~~co.deo ~"":.tc::,

1973. 1\.ctuo.lly1

lnn[;e

·::,:-;.~

c.o c::J.rl.J• o.z JSGS

Department of Ca.:n:nerce . u. s. Fordr,n Trode: H:i.c;..1:!.c;?1ts o~ !:)::,or~
e.nd !!:!ports, December 1973, !> . l~ 51 88. U. S . -Japan trade for !.973
totaled ¢17.9 billion. u. s. exports to J'o:.po.n m'!rc Vt'.~..ucd ~t ¢3.3
biJ~ion, nnd u. s. importo from J~~an totaled $9.6 billion.

- 8 -

e~'ij""Vv¥- Thereaf'tcr, in t.'le
the d.omina.!:lt ·._,.u.e~ c. icy v cr-=: to get out of Vietn't..,, to

vith the shoek o£ the Tet
Un1 ted ste.tea 1

leave the settlement of political problems to 1-xel parties, and to a.void

o1..l"'.i~'J.r

involvements in the f"uture.
::ncrc".o:ln~cy

Tra.nslnted into dipl<n!lC"J 1 thia c'ho.nc;e of attitude m:-.dc
respectable the concept

or

neutra._i zc.tion of IndocMna.

fran the position of John Footer
The Cold war rhetoric of

Dull~o

·~·~::.osive

T'oot wo.a c f'ttr

C". •

in the first Geneva Confe r ence o.r

19)4 .

Retaliation" of the 1950's 3...'1.<.1 t he doctr :lrr>c

of "flexible rcoponae" and "counterinsurgency" of the 1960's vere r epl.".'.ced by
the Nixon Doctrine

or

low profile.

To be sure, U. S. m111 te.ry a.i<l r c:n'lins a

factor in the situation and vestiges of earlier
s outheast Asia but these

~rc

~ilitary

deployment

r~nin

in

of declining i mpor..a.nce .· The tJnited s tc.tes i:l no

lonr;er engaged 1n eombe.t an:rwhe re :tn A31o. a.nd a Congressional directive no:-1
forbids milit..ary reengage!llent in Indochina.
U. S . policies to<,ro.rd. Korea end Tahr'O.!l still retain GC!ne cimro.ctc r1st1es of the Cold war.

T'acrc are lingering cr.totion::ll commitmento which

out of tre alliance 'f..J1th Chiang 1-C'li-s hek duri ng

~·Torld

involvement of the United Staten in tho Korean War.

Uar II

llOi.rever,

a~d

t !l.c d.!rcct.

t~e

Un::tccl St:lt.cs

has extricated 1tself from direct partic:!.pa.tion in the poli t1c:3 of

~.-h csc

o.nd ie on the road to complete 'Ji thdroml from their internn:t o.ffatrs

6. Prospecto in the People' a Republic of
The new em in U.
PM1:1'1e and Asia .

s.

g:t'O\."

:?kccc

.!/

Chin..~

policy correopond.s to m::!.jo.r clm.nges

~n

the 'Vic.stc:::-n

If the prospects for the future depend, in pert, on the

Preoidcnt Nixon stated in the Shn!'..ghai Connmmique that "It /J:ne United
Stateif reaffirms :1 tn inter e st in a pcac~ful ~cttlement of t:1e
To.i,ra..Tl quention by the Chinese themselves." The ll.dr:lini otretion ~ s
position 6n Korean retmlfic~tion ls t hnt :lt should be nec;ot ia.tcd
by North c.nd south Korea t h r ou,zh t he Florth -Sout h tall~ .
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The new China, it

looking 1n 1 ts pol1c1m.s .

ne~Jn1S

The

to me, 16 l ikely to r em1n lf.l.r gcly in'lr.'.ro.-

1~reas:tol".'3

of n v1.oi t to C:'l.iM i n 1972 ere

of a oelf-d.isciplined, ef't'icientjy orc;an:tzed1 dyl"..-.-w:i.c rm.d energetic

ti., r:·>::·r.~

:peopl~ .

The vordt aspects of' pre- 19119 Chir.!l.--st::u·va.tion , pcntiJ.cn~e , l,<:U"- lorC.icm, :.:-.....::
C't!.'::'-:- :-":". ~:::;,

of e ducotion, the Elbaence of ahel tcr for mil llo!ls , :lnd.:tf:f.'cr cncc -t.o 't't.rr-:>.n

e ~~!llinctct .

infla.tion and callous econo=nic CX!>loita.t1on--have l ong since been
r:Ncry aspect or society, the in<llcationn t-.re that China ia
t he basis of a nev egalit3ricn1om as

ex~lified

bei~ rc~u.::lt

O..."l

It is El ooci"!ty ,.;hich alrc..'1cy of'fers

present e.nd a decent hope for the future .

on

by CPJl1~ l~o ' o d~ct~~

"eerve the people." China ia ereot:..ng a .r.:::=::::=.:rmodern ooc1ety

t i ona of e.n ancient culture .

:'l:n

t he
~

~c:..nb-

l 1.va.blc

The new China 1a preoccupi c C.

•.'1.~<.h

in particular
l'encefu1 purposes and/wi th "t:1e nn ociv c probl ems or fecCi.inr; , ·cJ..oth::nc c.nc,,
shelterl~

and ed.ucat1~ 8oo mil lion P.copl~ .

to remain the prcoccupct1on of the People ' s

Unless prc-;o~ed., t:~:.:-.t i c :'..::!•.'C'l:r
Rcpu~li c

for n

Chino. ' s foreign policy he3 b een Eltructure<.1,
and eecurity.

Since t..'le I<:or co..11 vrnr,

Chinea ~.;

l~ns t _n~

troops l:c.vc f oucht o-:l"!...y fo r

c.~

c:~anl!in~

policie::~

to the rcalitiea of the

u11<1 a cro,rlnQ;

<.1~-

lc~t1J~r:::1 1p

on

in Ac:tn. Md. elc;miher c .

is <!o1ng ao, hOI,.ever, not on the basis of br-.yoncts but. by the purs ;~ t o?
cost and low key

Y~~'t

trn.O.i t:".o~:L- y

:f'ine d., not only by the governme-nt :!.n Pc1c1ng 1mt by the C'h1ncnc
To be sure, Ch1l"..a'o influence i c

C(~e .

pri::'~r:t ~·, ~o::: 1.:::-fc~c

the Chineae have co!'I..Si(lcr c d. to b e t heir ovm ter ri tory,!/

Te hre.!l.

to

i ntcrnc.tio~l

coll!:!er ce .

:'..0'~·...

~1:1n~~c ~ct::. c7.'D

prc~cnt intcrnati o~l oit\~t1on .

China ' s recent seizure of t he Pa re.cel lsl':lnds, f or mo:mnple, wc.o a c~-':le of
China acting to en:lorce o lon.?; ...hclt1 c:W.im ·to t..'lle :lolcndn ~ eel on
substantia l historica l precedent.
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The eurrent

att1~r~@~lie

u"nited Stlltcs, Jnpan, and

or Chim to-.=d the

t~vi'-'" uniu:-:tc:!'.s~ot only rrro the pr~.t:!.ry

concern for security and def'ennc but t:>.lno fro:n a. prud.cnt readiness to cx:?c.:m1.
mutually beneficial

the People' a Republic view-ed U.
Min ao the principal

For CNcr t•.ro

vith the rest of the t;orld.

conto.ct~

th~::.t

s.

c.~c!lc'•:-=,

ccmni tmcn·~s, tecopa, end nuclear wM.pO!:'..:l

to !t3 ey..istence.

:l~

Ti'..o.t io no lonecr the c::-.cc.

A growins; concern rega.rdins tl1c Soviet t;"nion has diluted this fec.r.
Chinese wrtime memories and ideoloe;-lco.l economic

intcrpr.:!t.:o.tior~

stir some concerns C1Ver a po:::c!b1e revival of J'::-.pc:..esc cll:1 "tc'lricm.
ht!s reservat1or..a about t..'l-te

i~licntions

SC1Viet Union and Japan in Soviet Asia.
~1e

or econo:nic col.laboretion

Pc~':.!n~

bet~:cen th~

t1-..c.t.

r7C"re:rthcleca , 1t should be r:otc

Chinese ra.pprochement with Jn.pa.n is fttrthc:r

count.I"J and Sino-Japo.neoe trc.d.e and exchan.?;c o:t"

~dvanced

per~ons

th!ln

n!.oo

~r.tth o.n~r oth,~r

1a extcnoive cnt,_

growing.
OVershad.O'.ling all other co:1siderotions, it is theSovict Un:.".on

seen as the nnjor threat to

Cl'LI'..:'). 'a s~cttri~y

and

dcfcns~

at

th~c -t::.::'!~.

divisions alone; the northe:!.'"n nnu Yi•cstern borclcrc, o. r;rowlng SCN1ct
in the 'vestcrn Pnciric, S<:Wiet efforts to csto.bl:!.ch a
system" 1n Asie, e.ll

the

po~s:tbility

tunnels

e.."l~

m1no11e~

of

s~cest

sud~en

cspeble or reachine

been CX!!::tn<!ed. to

1\~~.r.-:;--1;

c::•;';.~cc ~''"'<.'.. ...-::::.:~

1r:.c:'..u.~.:1.-c

• '~c!.c~

Z~openn Rt~s1o..

dispute is deep-seated, rith territorial

:;'c:---;n:-t.:.'1

"col~cctivc ::.~c•.trity

ettcck1 the c ticn of C"alm>. have been
r..~

:::o·:!c'.:.

!1.:-l.'tO.l

to C"t'.ino. 1 cncirc ...em~nt c.n<l 1:::olnt1on.

China's mili 't?.!J• tcchnolocr

th~:~ ~-~

cl~~~c, i~00losic~- dif~crcncc~,

- ll -

~.t-.

at leaot,
the years

immediate~

abeaa.

7. Contemporor:r J c!Jan
Japan has emerc;e<l aa o. m<Ylern, c emoc~tic ota.te and the !7'_1.jo:r
!'OWer

or

Aoie. and. the

miro.cle at all.

i~ef3tcrn

Pc.cific.

The

Ja:panco~ "~conomic

miracle"

ccc:J:~:~:·.c

'(,'"1'\~ !'.")

It '-"aS t:he reoult of' the hie;..1 technilloe;..co.l end e<l'.lcettior.!ll

to reeover from the wr, a.?ld th0 hnrd-•..J"ork and cooperation with <lhic...'-1 they
about this task.

To these ba.sic fo.ctom ..!r.\G aC:ucd a. blend

or

effcct~ve GO'Tt~!'!:':.: "'!l'G

planning, a vigorous entrepreneuria l oystcm nn , in the early ycnro 1 a
M3iat

or

aid from the Unitccl Stc.tc3.

enl1~htened

The

pre~cnt

ll!!'.O!lC

about ns effectively

thf! IXlrtico

0.::1

~ viablc ' poli~ical cyct~

in a d .mocro.cy that acc:ru:;

rc~:mlts

1::7

Gt~tco , Ja~ncoc

going through a period of ooul-3enrch:i.ns.
in:portrulce in thio connection :

tne

b::~c::;

American mL1tnry operot:!.on:J clcmncre.

independent of' the United

r.Jto:t~s,

forcicn

policy~--

Tw-o cvcnto have been of'

''!~bmn

Trenty or on the cont1nu::lncc o:': U. 3.

·,.;ork

~o

o.ny in t.c 'W'Orld.

Aa seen from the United

~~jor

dyncmic cconcey pl '3 an

press, free and S!'iritcd public debate,

a.nd compet1 tion

1c~'.:.

shoc?..s" or 1971, e.s

:!.n Jn:;:>an and

p::r"t:~cul:l::-

~:!.rc::(~ !'.ot~t,_,

o:ctn~'ilC

to

:::".,:'0:::'·~

In c. cimilo.r fc.::>hion, J:J.::c.n

an it h,_r.; cl:r.cc.dy

Cl.o:1~

c~.

uith recn:rC: to

n_co

·~'\1.0

-12-

!lid~ Eaat a~d Cbin.-1 end '~:~~~
Gome of thcoe 1n1tint1vc!l m.....

'·'-'..;M,

need not weo.ken the ticn betvcen

background
common

or

t~1e

choc.w"l!ror the United

t'\."0

n~.tior~<::

if tbc-J

~re

ct~tciJ

but

t:~'.Y'/

0./'.P.~n:::t tt.c-~

ceen

Japan 'e essential neco.n and 1n the lc.rger conter'.::. or contin>T.::.ng

intereo~.

On the 1\md..'l.ment:ll isoue or pence o.nC!. scc-J.r1.~J ~.n the "Jcc~~e:.-:':.1

Pa.cifie and a. flourishine world

trod~, J'a:;>o.n~oc

nn<1 ,'\merico.n

are 11ot

1ntercot~?

in eo!'lfl1et nnd should not be pc:mittcd to drift into conflict.
t.rnderste.nful.bly1 J'a-po.!'!c:::c policy tmro.rt'!. tho rest of Asia ms

eatni!lg vide accesa to nt.t'!.rkcts c.nc1 row !!".:ltcriulc .
consideration to n Mtion that d.cpcndn so

e;rcat~·

This •...rill ah:ayc

on roreten trod.c.

~imozi. ~J.:.

c o.

critic~l

nut t:1c

o.nti-J'npaneoe riots or Januru.-J 197!~ in nouth<:-.not Ania de::r.onatro.ted. the ncc~cn:l'·.y

for Japan to rethink oaoe of the policicc o.nd methods that
1.n this connection.

Robert rt.crramo.ra. of

th~

~ve

been

c~l~rcd

World Eanlt and. others hcve ro:lntcci.

out that most Japanese economic 'aid has con~1.:::~tec1 of' e:r.:port credit:::. or (1b:cct.
investment closelJ• tied to cotrn(!\rcL'i.l
o.f' ._Tapnn has been urze". to
it has been suggested.

th~.t

cro.nt ffiore

intereot~

cmd profits .

Thl"! C-o-rcrrtm.c"lt

li'bcr.::ll rcpo.;yr.\ent te1ms on aid-loo.n:';, c-.nC.

Jnpo.nese irotestors be more conccious of their

r"~:1or-. s:: -

b111t1es to help provide employment ancl ir,tpro\·e liYirt-3 stando.rds in tlc co1.ntry
of investment .

'""hether or not thio

courn~ 1~

the c.."lower to the .rn.n'l"'.l"Y r::.ot:J,

the problem or m1ntt\1ning o. vicoroun trntle ·.rithout allcnn:tinc; the :)r>•::n:•cr cour.t !'::.c::;

of ll.o1a. rep:r.csants a mo..jor foreic;n policy challcn[:;e for Jcpnn in

t~~

yco.:r.n

~~:.<:::--:'.•

Th1e particular queotion in not directly involved :ln Jo.IJan 'c tmrlc
vith

t~e Peopl~'s

Republic of

~ina .

~·ihilc

the latter 1d.cnt1fies

\w"it~1

countries, t.'le fact is that the level o"f sclf-conf:tdencc end cconc:mt:lc
in Chinn is nlreacy high an1 io rinin3 rep:l.dly .
1s tM potential f'or

.rc.pnn~nc -Ch1ncse

r.~orc

to t:1c point,

cconc:nic dva.lry in

th~

t'd.-.;; poo:t:<c!'

CC.."!llJctcl'l~c

t:1~rcforep

year(': ei.1c:1C. .

In

- 1.3 a&u.tion, there are

potent~~t

of the East aud south Chir..o.

The diff'icu.lties of

oJI..' ;.!.:J

re:l'lninit~~

',

\i~Li.Cil (.U'C

n<::utra.l

~n

V¥bore arce.s around the O.c:.Or.·::.O

rcporT.CU to be rich in

the

G~~no-aoviet

clioputc obo pocc n

dile!ll!Jla for Japan whose peace and lonc-rc.nt3c ccono:n.ic '1-!Clfa.re

mainte!'..ance of good rcl:ltiom vHh both

8. Ta.hro.n an<l south

cre~t

pctrolm~.

depc~t~ 0-:1 t!1c

nc:i.gi1bo:ra •

Kor~~ in

L:i..:Po
!t :i.n

Taiwan arul south Koren cleo face o futuro of uncc:rt:l1nt:lco.
doubtful that the sta.tun quo ctm be r.:J.inta.incd for very long in
the end, only tvo p.:>.ths aro open, u drii't.
an acco:!I:ll0do.t1on W'i th the me.inlc.n!!,

and people o£ the 1alruld alone.

to;;~rd:l ~cp=:.rc~ico

:n

rr:.::.~-:::..'1.

or a. r:.crre

J~1:..:l:rc.:.C

o:f~~:cy ~n ·t.hc for::: of an c.t~tc:~o..~.0'-!!3

In.ool'ar en t."le united Stt:tcc io conccrncC..,

present policy recoGnizca the ialnnd

c~ Chinc~e

rcconclkir.~

but the qucction of

evi table choice .

have been U!.ken by the Korroru::. to Cco.l with the

n.r:~-:u:olli:l o1:b.l~'.;io.

•

;.;ou'.;;h

Corea hrul tried to cetablioh contact with the Soviet Un:lon and C 1ino..
hnve a.l9o been

rapprochement.

r~orth-South tcJ.l.:n

w ich, a.t ..c:?.Ot 1 ltecp C~.ive "t1.1c pcc::;.:l.'vi:i ty

the direct ion or rec onciliation with the

or

c::

'!'he pro'!>:em is complicated b;y· poli'..;!.cn-1 difficult:i.c::l "itll:!.r.

political presEnlrce a.re r.rl.tic;ated .C:t.hin Sout..'l Koreo. o.nd

focal point

T11cro

potentia.l conflict.

1\or'~l, r~orro

pro~re:::;o c~n

v-lll rc:r.":lin c

be

~C.c ::~

chncero~
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This mueh is c:ertrdn, ·..r:1 t..l> !"ec-.crd to the futuro role of th::- t7n tell
states in Asia and the western Pe.c:tfic: .

'rt1o inccosa.nt w..rfo.re, cold o.nd •. o~,

during the paat tventy-five ycaro hcs been pro,:r.css1vcly wearing

or the United States.

o~

p!)~k

t!1.c

In the co.rl.v l~O'o, millions of' All".cricnn::; ct11l 1Y!ltcv0•:.

tM.t tho United states should ehOl\lder any burO.•.m to rcsiot tomlit.o.r .o.ni::>!!l

everywhere o.nd to bring frecd.otl and soc::to.l pror:rco::1 to the
Vietn~

people~

or

t...t-:.c

~ror!..t.•

dam:!tged these idcoloxico.l beliefs and Ghifte<l the pra.ct:tcaJ. co;lccrns

ot 1\.'11ericw..s inwrd to the severe

a.~~ot.ic

to the aurfaet ou:t of the cm.u:n:i:'lS of the
vith its devastating psycholog1cal,

pro".1lcm3 ::md. c:onf11cto w;

!ndecd1 the Vict=t'!:'.m0::e

W"'J .

fin~ncial,

~ch

and cQcial

ro:::::':!
~or:r?lic·i:.,

effect~, pr~:cu

to

Toc'ley, policies t-tith rcc:m:l to nc.t1.or.:ll defense and forciG:'l c.:i.<l

come to aupport reduetiom in defc11:1e expcnd:l.turcc,
lJ . :3. troope end bases overs ens .

t-:-:l.t!

r~[7'.x-O.

Conu.csn f:"P.Vc o. recent dicplc.y or e:,

more critical attitude to\ro.rd foreign nid
vot~d

espe::~..Lly

w~c~ t~c Rett~c

of

to

~t.~ch

neprecc~t~t~vcc

down a ncv c:ontr1but1on to the Inte~ntio~~l ~elovncnt Acsoc~~t1on,

the ''eoft loon" affiliate of the Inte!"r'.=.tion.o.l :";:::.!1k.

d c{'e;:>led
tt _-:;,•.:::.:=:-n

deeioively an Administrat:ton

ass!3tanc:e to Soo..tth VietnOI:'l. in

F~.sec.1

rcq'lV~:!.t

IJ.fhc Hou~e c.bo in

to m:!sc the ceilinc

.1\,rn

0:1

2.?74

:n:i.l::.':C..'-'":'

Ye!'..r 19n.

In the present t..mer:tco.n mcod, pro;)o:::nb for oeo!'lcn:!.c nc .f-:.mff::.C::.cncy

end cutarey he:ve g('.ined. a better reception :•.n tl:.e Uni'tcd Sto.t-::lo than et.t a:cy ·:;-:_:::-. )
since t!1e greet <lcprens ion of the 1930' a .

heie;htened this tendency.

euf'ficiency in energy.

tcne

'i:'hc !\.rn'b oil c:,1bc.rco, of coU!·oo,

!'r".!lf,C n9.t1o~~l polie!c~

Precsurcs ere cloo prcocnt for

no'\<T look to ncli'rcotr1ct1o~ C:'l c:~o:'t~

,.·

- 15 ..
of bn.s1e
concr~se

producta .
These trends in public

ovinio~

vhich nrc ref1ectea in the congreGs

of U. S . policy, but they also pretJcnt r.ew

\'1:J.nc;e~·s.

There :i.a., for

~~ple, 1.\

danc;er of going f'ram the cxtr.:·me of e.. trQ.Gic m:i.li to:r;{ intc:r-.rention in

to the extreme of

indlffere!'.C~

The fact 113 that the

iJnit~d

£L"1d o.. d5.sintcrcst in 'l.":nt transpires :t!'l.

Gtates has o. pem.n.ncnt concern in t!1e
interru.~tion:~.l

not to speak of e. vi tal 1nterent in
tinuit'..g avareness or whn.t
developments .

P~

Ind.oc~'.::!lf.'.

t~:ces

plo.ce in

excessive econom::c

~.;c::rtc:::-n

B<::~th ~!'!!n.:tn(1.

.. o.c:i.::~.c,

a con-

end O.!'Proprlo.tc respon:;cs to

A~i.'l

~tion~lisn,

the very foundation of the 1i!"..k vi t'h Jn.;:>an.

peace.

.t\.t.::i.~.•

for eY.nm?le, oould

t~reatc~

The i!.c:r..ic.l of U. S. r.r.rk<::t:'.'l to

Jcpru1 or tho susren.'lion of' acricultu.ral sc.lcn Ccrt!ld rec;ult

in o. ca:n;,;letc

sh'lpirJB o:r the reln.tionohip bctvcen .J.:.:?:l..'l'l ani' t:"c • nitcd Sto.tcn to the

rc-

C.r:""trl;-::~·::lt

o:f' bot.h. nations .

A valid U. S . pollc:{

rm~t

c..<!j'..:.nt to the

as well as to pres3uros from \d thin the Unl tc

cil.1l.I".Ci~g con~ tio!13

Gt3.t.cn .

I believe 1t cnn rern.ain 1 ho•.tever, c. por:;it5.ve 1)0JJ.cy.
contaimnent and mili to.ry prc•c!llinence need not be
A contraction of U. S . mili tnry forces, for
creative diplomacy Cl.e3icned to b•\ll<l
tion,

ne~otiation

and n

gro~nn~

~

m:ll::"t~:>:J·

t'.nd. d.ic.:ln·::c!'c:::·::;.

can be a.ccm'!I'O..."'l.:l.c<l by a

volume of mult:ll...'ttcr:-:>.1 economic

open its markets to the whole ranee of
th~

T'ac e.ltorn.:-.t:l.ve to

ncu atructure of peace bo.accl on conc::.::.io.-

In this connection, the United

Pacific within

It s . oul<J. re!"'/lin artd.,

no11-involve::r.~nt

CY....'1..'"!lp1e,

:i.n t.JJ:tc.

st.'J.tcc

e)~orts

context of 1 t::; o•m neec'l...n.

int~rch~·.r..cc.

cnn :nakc every effort

of t e notions of

i·Thil·~

~o :~:ccr>

t1~ 7~ctcrn

i .t is proper for tl~e Uni tc1

- 16 -

not be done

~

either ea'lc unc1.c:::- t.h.rrot of' econo:n:tc retal:i..n.tion o::-

~ol:t tical

reprisal.

be given to multilateral ni<! nrronc;cmcntn alone; the linen or the :ntcrGove!'mlental Group on !ndoneoia
through United Nations

m~c1

the

or~ni~:-..tion:J .

JI~<Jian

"Dcvelopncnt En.:!'..!t, n."ld poM5.bl;r

The sov:!.et. Union an<l Chinn e::-.n be

~n-

vi ted. to I>nrt1c1pate ln con.ntructi\•e proc:ramc of thin ltind.
fit one time , it was the poliC'J of the United States to

the nmr of private foreiGn invcstn:cnt in
end incentives were offered for

t~i::::

circumstanc~ ,

be

this policy

~t

0.

r'<lndom

purpose .

re.~h1on.

probl~s

nnd needs

ree~lncd.

~rlthin

vo.rto~

gu::trnntc'"'n

! t seems to me that -:n

t11e United

!)rc::~ ~nt

Excessively ot:tmulntcd 1nvc::.'.:;-

ment a.brood is not only d1.stcrt1ve of t~1c flow of' cap1 tel,
to eurre!nt

::>~.:.~mulntc

~tatec .

it

doe:::. not cc:::-~c:·;~o~U.

!.: orco\rcr,

~:"l~n cc.:~ 1...·: :.

e-re no lo!"l-e:er essential or even <.'tesimblc in terns of the :::ccu.rl ty o-.:' thr

or of the Un1 tee!.

u. s.

st~tes .

This

Senate at the prencnt

proble~n 1~ a~tivczy

unc"i.cr cxn.:nin::-.tion

t,;:,.c

t~e .

In mill t..ary m:t tter.s, the contint:ed contrc.ct!on of
A51a seems to me to be

~-n

~·c::;:.or..

:! Ve"!"'.f p~er

course ?or t he Unitccl

e.cploy!"lcn'.:.~

sto.te~

5.'1.

:::-1

prc =-~n';

-

~7

-

onl:f to etimulate anti-U.
should be

ree~ined

and,

given to countriea under a Cold

~:cr

policy \i'1l:l.ch

!1,!!S
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